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Abstract 
 
The objective of the present study is to answer the question whether the corporate organized 
retail outlets (ORO) have exerted any harmful effects on the small unorganized retail outlets 
(URO) in India. Answer to this question will facilitate us to gauge the impact of corporate 
FDI in retail on the survival of the small unorganized retail outlets, which is currently debated 
rigorously in India. Based on the primary survey data collected from the National Capital 
Region and Chennai between November 2008 and March 2010, the analysis in this study 
shows that the emergence of ORO did displace some URO, but increased employment in 
urban areas. The displaced URO, which opened businesses away from ORO have increased 
their profits. This indeed is a blessing in disguise for the small unorganized retail outlets. 
Thus, the total effects produced net social benefit in terms of income and employment 
generation in the concerned region.  
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Introduction 
A strong economy, rising wealth levels, and the rapidly changing life styles and consumer 
aspirations of an ever-growing middle class are some major reasons for the organized retail 
boom in India. Retailing accounts for 14 to 15 percent of its GDP and the growth of real 
consumption in India has been robust, at about six per cent per annum during the last two 
decades. The Indian retail market is estimated to be about $450 billion and one of the top five 
retail markets in the world by economic value (Mckinsey, 2010).  Given these developments 
in the retail sector, the corporate organized retailers see great opportunity for growth in the 
retail sector, which has thus far been dominated by the unorganized operators.1 There are 
studies in India and abroad examining the impact of the growth of corporate retailers, 
whether domestic or foreign, on unorganized small businesses. For example, in the case of 
India, the Navadanya Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology (NRFSTE) 
in Delhi through its study has argued that the entry of the corporate retails has a cascading 
impact on unorganized small retailers. The study has shown that small and petty shop owners, 
as well as fruit and vegetable vendors in the vicinity of big corporate retailers had suffered 
from a major fall in their income, and those unable to face the competition were forced to 
withdraw from the profession by closing down their shops (NRFSTE, 2008). On  the other 
hand, a survey based research study conducted by the Indian Council on International 
Economic research (ICRIER) at the behest of the Government of India indicates price 
benefits to farmers, lower prices to consumers and almost no effect on the traditional retailers 
(Joseph et al., 2008). 
Again a recently submitted Parliamentary Standing Committee report recommended, among 
other measures: “.a blanket ban on domestic corporate heavyweights and foreign retailers 
from entering into retail trade in grocery, fruits and vegetables” (Government of India, 2008). 
Another equally important recommendation to the Government of India was to restrict 
domestic corporate heavyweights and foreign retailers from opening big shopping Malls for 
selling other consumer products. On the other hand, Kohli and Bhagwati (2011) have argued 
that corporate retailing would benefit small retailers and consumers and both small and large 
retailers can coexist in India without harming any groups. Recently in January 2013, Stiglitz 
in his lecture on ‘Redefining Capitalism,’ organized by the Asian Development Research 
                                                 
1 The unorganized retail outlets refer to businesses run by a single owner with his family members and with few 
hired workers mainly known to the owner’s family.  
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Institute in Patna argued “India has a very large supply of entrepreneurs. It is exporting 
entrepreneurs to America and countries all over the world. Within the country too there is 
strong entrepreneurship. Moreover, retail technology was widely available. And one of the 
successes of India’s entrepreneurs is they know how to apply our technology” (The Hindu, 15 
January, 2013). He also raised doubts that FDI in retailing can deliver any benefits to small 
businesses in India. Global studies on large scale retailing also have contradictory views (see 
for example, Dube, Eidlin and Lester, 2005; Aoyama, 2007; and Anon Higon and  Vasilakos, 
2008). 
Nevertheless, on 7 December 2012, with the approval of the Parliament, the Government of 
India announced that India welcomes 51% foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand 
retail sector and 100% FDI in single brand, subject to approvals by individual states. As a 
way of guaranteeing the benefits to small and medium businesses, the government has 
imposed two significant riders on foreign retailers. First, they will have to compulsorily 
source one-third of the products they sell from small and medium enterprises whose 
investments do not exceed $1 million in total. Second, they will have to invest at least $100 
million, half of which has to go into backend infrastructure over three years. In the wake of 
these different arguments, more intensive studies using primary data are required for taking 
better policy decisions concerning both corporate organized and small unorganized retailers.  
 
The central question in this paper is: whether corporate retailing, mainly from domestic 
sources, in India that started in 1995 has had any negative effects in terms of reduced sales, 
reduced profit, and employment loss on small unorganized retailing. Answers to these 
questions will be useful to gauge the impact of corporate FDI in retail on unorganized retail 
outlets, which is the on-going debate in India.  It is in this context, that a pilot study as Phase 
I involving a primary survey and interviews were undertaken with the financial support from 
the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) in Tokyo and 
logistics support by the Centre for Global Development Research (CGDR) in Noida from 
November 2008 to July 2009 in five cities in India--Delhi, Gurgaon, Noida, Bangalore, and 
Chennai (see Figure 1 for survey locations).  
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Delhi
GURGAON
NOIDA
Bangalore
Chennai
Survey Locations
Delhi: New  Delhi City & Rural 
delhi
Haryana (HY): Gurgaon and 
Faridabad cities and Villages in 
Sonipat
Uttar Pradesh  (UP): NOIDA &  
Villages in Agra
Karnataka (KT): Banaglore and 
village  in Kolar
Tamil Nadu (TN): Chennai  and 
Village in Krishna district of 
Andhra  Pradesh
 
 
Figure 1: Locations of the Survey areas of the FASID-CGR study 
 
 
The primary survey involved collecting data through questionnaires from the managers of big 
shopping Malls, corporate retailers, consumers, and those unorganized retailers who were in 
the vicinity of the corporate retailers. The analyses in the Phase I study showed that 
consumers gained in terms of low pricing when they shopped with corporate retailers.2  Thus, 
from the consumers’ perspective, expansion of organized retailing is preferred as different 
Malls and corporate retailers compete with each other and stabilize prices. Therefore, it can 
be safely argued that government must not interfere with the expansion of organized market 
and in fact promote it so that more Malls and corporate retail outlets are there to compete 
with each other. Corporate retailing and big shopping Malls did generate significant 
employment in urban areas. These results support the findings of the ICRIER study. On the 
contrary, small and unorganized retailers expressed a significant amount of dissatisfaction 
towards the growth of corporate retailing and the emergence of big shopping Malls, which in 
their views are contributing negatively to their survival due to the decline of customers and 
profits. The survey results clearly indicate that a number of small unorganized businesses had 
                                                 
2 Results of the Phase I study were presented in a seminar at the Asian Development Bank Institute in Tokyo in 
August 2009, and in the Asian Economic Panel meeting held at the Keio University in Tokyo in October 2009. 
The revised version was published in Kalirajan, Drysdale and Singh (2010). 
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to close down their shops due to the arrival of big shopping Malls and organized retailers in 
their vicinity. 
 
The objective of this paper is to answer the following questions that have emanated from the 
Phase I study: 
(a) How intensive was the effect of organized retailing as the reason for the displacement of 
small unorganized businesses?  
(b) What is their present source of income and how much is the difference from the previous 
source?  
(c) How many other persons were affected due to the closure of the establishment and what 
are they doing after the closure?  
 
The following section details the Phase II study that was undertaken from August 2009 to 
March 2010 with the financial support from FASID and logistic support by CGDR to answer 
the above questions. Theoretical model, survey methodology and survey instruments are 
discussed. The next section through the evidence based approach identifies the characteristics 
of the surviving small businesses and the small businesses that were displaced due to the 
arrival of the organized retailing. The following section through the econometric analysis 
concentrates on the conditions of the closed-down URO. Here a three-step analysis is 
presented namely the condition of the URO before the arrival of the organized retailers and 
Malls; characteristics of the URO contributing to the closure of business; and condition of the 
closed-down URO after the displacement. A final section brings out the overall conclusions 
of this Phase II study. 
 
Theoretical Model, Methodology and Instruments 
The emergence of the big Malls and domestic and foreign corporate ORO, which are capital 
intensive, can be viewed as an economic situation of a country enjoying an exogenous 
increase in capital stock. Hence, drawing on the Rybczynski’s theorem of international trade, 
the impact of the emergence of big Malls and corporate ORO on the output supply of small 
URO can easily be understood. 
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Figure 1. The impact of ORO on sales of URO 
 
 
In the above diagram, S refers to the output of big Malls and corporate ORO, which is capital 
intensive and T refers to output of small URO. With the initial existing capital and labour, the 
economy produces at X0, which is the point of tangency of the production possibility frontier 
and the price line. The endowment of capital is increased due to the emergence of the 
corporate ORO. When the country gets an increase in capital with no change in labour, the 
country would move towards a new production possibility frontier with capital biased 
growth. What are the effects of this movement on product prices, and output levels across 
ORO and URO? Initially relative output prices are fixed and therefore, factor prices are fixed 
too. The new production point is X1, which is the point of tangency of the new production 
possibility frontier and the price line drawn parallel to the earlier prices line to show that 
there are no changes in prices. This without doubt indicates that the output S should increase 
and output T should decrease. 
 
Now, to examine the impact of the growth in S on output prices, it is assumed that both goods 
supplied by ORO and URO are not inferior goods. With the shift in the production possibility 
frontier, it is rational to argue that national income would increase. This means demand for 
goods of both ORO and URO must increase. That is, the new equilibrium on the new 
production possibility frontier will not be at X1, but should lie in between the area on the new 
production possibility frontier created by the right angle triangle drawn at the point X0 of the 
initial endowment production possibility frontier. The slope of this segment on the new 
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production possibility frontier is not as steep as the slope of the price line at X0. This implies 
that the relative price of goods of URO will be higher in the new equilibrium situation. Thus, 
theoretically one would expect that the growth of big Malls and corporate ORO would 
decrease the demand for outputs of small URO and that consumers would enjoy cheaper 
prices for goods of ORO. 
Drawing on the location theory, it is rational to argue that Malls and ORO generally aim for 
locations in and around the more affluent suburbs of cities and towns. Those strategies would 
create an important ‘locational’ gap in the sense that less affluent suburban and rural areas 
would be left out as unprofitable for Malls and ORO operations (Wrigley and Coorah, 2003). 
Thus, the reduction in URO outputs and profit due to the emergence of ORO can be arrested 
by changing the location of the operation of the URO. This is feasible with the increasing 
trend of urbanization in many countries as shown in Figure 2 and India is no exception. In 
India, as in any other developing country, the cities are growing and urbanization is 
accelerating. Thus, the increasing population at the city boundaries provides ample 
opportunity to closed-down URO to increase their sales and income. 
 
 
 
CITY 
CENTRE
TARGET 
AREA  FOR 
MALLS AND 
ORGANISED 
RETAIL 
OUTLET
CITY EXPANSION
 
Figure 2. A model of feasible survival of unorganized retail outlets 
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The above location theory diagram can be summarized as follows: 
City geography/demography can be divided into three categories: (1) Core city in and around 
city centre and its suburbs; (2) city expansion and creation of new suburbs; and (3) 
urbanization of rural population around core city and expanded plan. The residential 
population grows faster in the second and third sectors of the city due to lower rental, while 
rental in the core city accelerates faster due to the increasing occupation of office space and 
business centers. Malls and ORO look for localities, where high percentage of population is 
affluent and receptive to modern life style and at the same time is convenient to reach out. 
With the emergence of Malls and ORO, the URO lose customers and their margins go down. 
If such UOR are functioning through rented space, and are low in scale of operation, they are 
more adversely affected. Devoid of profits, these UOR close their businesses and move out of 
the market place.  Nevertheless, the closed-down shops can reopen in areas far away from the 
influence of Malls and ORO and earn more profits. Such areas are typically the newly 
expanding areas of the city or nearby urban development. The Malls and ORO provide 
additional employment, which increases the city income and city expands further albeit with 
the help of other activities and such a business cycle repeats. This process would continue till 
equilibrium is reached and full employment is created. 
The present study, which follows an evidence-based approach, will test the above theoretical 
predictions. Specifically, the approach followed in this study is to examine the validity of the 
current debate that the emergence of the ORO would displace URO. Thus, there are two sets 
of questions. The first set of questions is: whether the presence of ORO displaced URO from 
the location in which the latter was operating for many years? If so, how did these displaced 
URO differ in characteristics from the URO that continued operation in the same location 
even after the arrival of the ORO? Such identification can help the policymakers to minimize 
the harmful effects of ORO on URO through appropriate policy measures. The second set of 
questions is: whether all the displaced URO totally closed down their businesses as argued by 
the NRFSTE? If not, what did they do for living after the displacement? Answers to the 
above questions are primarily based on data obtained from surveys conducted in the locations 
where the ORO have recently opened business. However, secondary sources such as relevant 
web sites, and published reports including census 2001 have also been used to complement 
the survey results. 
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Thus, the objectives are to gauge the effect on income, employment and displacement due to 
the emergence of the ORO and to examine the current economic status of the displaced URO. 
It is a bench mark study for setting up the premise for an all India study at a later stage.  
Accordingly the study was confined to the NCR (Delhi, Noida, Gurgoan and Faridabad), and 
Chennai in south India.3 
To complement the evidence-based approach, a simple econometric decision model with 
limited dependent variable is estimated with the survey data. Here, there are two types of 
decision problems for the URO: first whether to close the business in its initial location, 
where it operated for many years, and secondly, which alternative source of income the 
closed-down URO will choose from among the discrete alternatives, such as reopening the 
same business in another location, reopening in another location with different type of 
business, and taking-up employment in another business. The first decision problem is solved 
by estimating a bivariate probit model, while the second problem is solved by estimating a 
multivariate probit model. 
Let the decision model of a small URO i at time t be given by: 
*
it it itI Z w                                (1) 
where *itI  is a variable that reflects an individual URO’s preference, Z is a vector of 
determinants of business operation,   is the corresponding vector of coefficients, and w is a 
normal random variable with mean zero and a unit variance.  Variable *itI  is unobservable, 
but a dummy variable itI  is observed and defined by: 
    1itI   if *itI  0      (closed-down business)                                 (2) 
    0itI    otherwise    (survival without closing-down) 
Equations (1) and (2) facilitate the working out of the probability of closing-down the URO: 
     Prob 1 Prob Probit it it it itI w Z w Z                    (3) 
                                                 
3 It may be mentioned that locating the displaced traders/ shopkeepers is not an easy task to perform. First of all 
personal visits had to be made to the shops operating in the area close to the ORO. Information is collected 
about the closed businesses and their owners and then, personal visits were made to interview such affected 
persons. 
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The probability of survival without closing-down the business is equal to 
[  1 Prob it itw Z   ].  Equations (1) and (2) constitute a simple probit model. Thus, the 
decision probability can be represented as a linear function of the determinants of business 
operation, which can be estimated using STATA 12. 
With respect to the second decision problem, let there be n displaced URO. Let there be m-
options of alternative sources of income (Ri, i=1,2,..m) for the displaced URO. Let G1, G2, 
…Gk refer to URO characteristics and other control variables. The m-linear probability 
equations are as follows: 
ijiq
k
q
ijqiij uGR  
1
                   i = 1,2,…m  and j = 1,2,…..n                   (4) 
The variance-covariance matrix of uij is symmetric and the covariances are assumed to be 
non-zero with the restriction that var(u1i) = …… = var(umi) = 1 for the identification 
purposes. Under the assumption of joint normality of the error terms a ‘m’ variables 
multivariate probit model is estimated. The dependent variables in above equations indicate, 
whether the displaced URO chose a particular type of income source after closing-down the 
URO in the previous location. Thus, the dependent variable is represented by a dummy 
variable suggesting whether a particular displaced URO chose a particular type of income 
earning source.  
In order to estimate the parameters under this setting, a log likelihood function is employed, 
which depends on the multivariate standard normal distribution function. The empirical 
framework involves estimating multivariate binary - dependent variable models. Drawing on 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), the multivariate probit model can be estimated using the 
method of simulated maximum likelihood, which is known as the Geweke- Hajivassiliou- 
Keane (GHK) estimator. The GHK estimator expresses the multivariate normal distribution 
function as the product of sequentially conditional univariate normal distribution functions 
that can be easily and accurately evaluated. In the case of multivariate normal limited 
dependent variable models, the simulated probabilities of the GHK simulator are unbiased 
and are bound within the (0,1) interval and is more efficient in terms of variance of the 
estimator of probabilities than other simulators like ‘acceptance-rejection’ or ‘stern 
simulator’. It is consistent as the number of draws and the number of observations tends to 
infinity and thus satisfies the asymptotic property of maximum likelihood estimators 
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003).  
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Characteristics of the Surviving and Displaced URO before and after the 
arrival of ORO: Evidence based approach 
Table 1 presents the number of businesses listed, number of reported closed shops and the 
number of respondents interviewed from closed businesses in the national capital region 
(NCR) and Chennai.  In NCR (Delhi, Gurgaon, Noida and Ghaziabad) 2, 859 shops were 
listed in 51 localities. As per the information received from these shops, 973 shops were 
closed down in the area.  Out of these, 198 (20.35 percent) traders were traced for interviews.  
In Chennai, 555 shops were listed in 26 localities and 70 (12.61 percent) were reported to be 
closed down. Out of 70 closed businesses, 50 addresses were located for interviews (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Number of shops listed, Number of shops reported to have closed  
and Number of respondents interviewed from the closed shops 
Sl. 
No State  Zone 
Number of 
localities 
visited 
Listing 
(No) 
Closed shops 
Number 
Reported   
Number 
Interviewed 
% Reported 
of  total 
listed shops 
%  
interviewed  
1 Delhi 
North  8 353 144 27 40.79 18.75 
South 10 484 111 44 22.93 39.64 
East 10 591 229 24 38.75 10.48 
West 12 661 223 46 33.89 20.63 
Center 2 90 24 4 26.67 16.67 
Total 42 2179 731 145 33.55 19.84 
2 GURGAON Total 3 108 116 8 107.41 6.9 
3 FARIDABAD Total  2 135 40 17 29.63 42.5 
4 GHAZIABAD Total 2 95 26 8 27.37 30.77 
5 NOIDA Total 2 345 60 20 17.39 33.33 
6 NCR Total 51 2859 973 198 34.03 20.35 
7 CHENNAI 
North  5 95 9 2 9.47 22.22 
South 9 208 23 21 11.06 91.3 
East 7 152 33 22 21.71 66.67 
West 4 70 5 5 7.14 100 
Center 1 30 0 0 0 0 
Total 26 555 70 50 12.61 71.43 
 8 All   Total 77 3417 1043 248 30.52 23.78 
 
 
Two sets of questionnaires were structured and canvassed in order to obtain feedback from 
the surviving unorganized retail outlets and closed outlets. The first schedule is in the form of 
detailed listing covering surviving businesses, while the second schedule is used as the main 
instrument to interview the closed businesses. The main schedule is designed to cover three 
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types of information about the business of the closed retailers.  This provides information to 
understand the reasons for the closure in more details rather than just confining only to the 
entry of the organized retail outlets (ORO) because the impact of the emergence of the ORO 
on URO should be channeled through various factors either directly or indirectly. To identify 
those factors inducing displacement, we have used both the “with and without” and also the 
“before and after” methodology for comparison of their education status; experience; and 
their business profiles for both displaced and surviving category of retailers. Such analysis 
will highlight the differences in business characteristics between the surviving and the 
displaced URO, which bear policy implications. 
 
Education and Business experience 
Table 2 shows that there is hardly any difference in educational status and business 
experience between the two groups of owners of small businesses. The average number of 
years of education is similar for both survivors and the displaced with a caveat that for 
Chennai it is marginally higher for the closed-down businesses. Concerning the business 
experience, it is equal in aggregate terms at 8 yrs, but there are some variations. The 
relationship between business experience and displacement can be both ways. Retailers with 
greater experience are likely to stay on in unfavorable circumstances as compared to 
relatively new entrants. This is noticed in Chennai, Gurgaon and Ghaziabad. On the contrary, 
in Noida and Faridabad the closing-down businesses had more experience than those who 
stayed on. This could be attributed to the fact that the movers had relatively greater business 
hope to anticipate in different locations.  
 
Table 2: Education and Experience Profile of Unorganized Retailers:  
Survivors and Closed 
Retailer Status Education (yrs) Business Experience (yrs) 
 Survivors Closed Survivors Closed 
Delhi 10 10 8 8 
Gurgaon 9 9 9 6 
Faridabad 9 9 7 13 
Ghaziabad 10 11 7 6 
Noida 10 9 6 10 
Chennai 11 12 9 7 
All 10 10 8 8 
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Floor area and Ownership Status of the unorganized retail outlets (URO) 
Table 3 presents city-wise average floor area and ownership status and average rent of the 
tenants for both survivors and closed businesses4. The average floor area across six cities for 
the survivors is recorded at 136 square ft and for closed URO almost half its size at 78 sq. ft. 
The comparison of average floor area reveals that displaced retailers had shop area, which 
constituted only 57 percent as compared to that of survivors in aggregate terms and more so 
in Delhi where it is less than 50 percent. This is due to the fact that about 40 percent of the 
displaced is vendors with about 15 sq. ft floor area. In Chennai, however, the floor area for 
both   survivors and closed URO is comparable of about 100 sq. ft. as there are no vendors in 
the sample due to different market structure. This reflects that impact on displaced is 
relatively high on the vendors and petty shops. Thus, size of operation is likely to be a factor 
in competing with the ORO. 
 
Table 3: City-wise Average Floor Area, Ownership Status and Average Rent (RS.): 
Surviving and Closed URO 
   Floor Area(sq Ft)  Ownership status of Survivors (%) 
Ownership status of Closed 
(%) 
Average Rent of the 
tenants(Rs) 
Status Survivors Closed Owners Tenants All Owners Tenants All Survivors Closed                     
Delhi 147 69 89 11 100 23 77 100 637 2608 
Gurgaon 103 58 91 9 100 25 75 100 486 2344 
Faridabad 138 51 92 8 100 18 82 100 656 2700 
Ghaziabad 116 87 97 3 100 25 75 100 316 2225 
Noida 125 87 94 6 100 20 80 100 423 3218 
Chennai 105 109 24 76 100 2 98 100 1553 2146 
All 136 78 79 21 100 18 82 100 751 2549 
 
Regarding the ownership status of the shops, it was found that 79 percent of the surviving 
URO were owners of the shops, whereas in the case of closed-down URO, 82 percent were 
tenants. In NCR cities, more than 90 percent of the survivors were owners of their retail 
outlets. In Chennai due to the well developed rental market 76 and 98 percent of survivors 
and displaced respectively were tenants. Clearly, with increasing rental such shops are always 
under the threat of closure. Their profits are likely to be thinner, which makes it difficult to 
survive the competition from the ORO. Even among the tenants, the average rent per month 
paid by the closed-down URO were much higher at Rs. 2, 549/- per month as against only 
Rs.751/- per month paid by the surviving URO. The rental differential for survivors and 
                                                 
4 The typical Indian retail shops are very small. Over 14 million outlets operate in the country and only 4% of 
them being larger than 500 sq ft (46 m2) in size. India has about 11 shop outlets for every 1000 people. 
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displaced was substantially more in NCR towns. However, this differential was relatively less 
in Chennai, where the average rent paid by survivors was Rs. 1, 553 and that by displaced 
was Rs. 2, 146. These figures reflect that rental was one of the key factors for the survival of 
URO. Thus, shops existing in relatively cheaper premises could survive without much 
hardship. 
From the above discussion, it becomes evident that the closed-down URO were in a much 
disadvantageous position with respect to floor area, ownership status and rent paid by the 
tenants than the surviving URO.  All these factors made difficult for the closed-down URO to 
survive mainly due to the decline in total sales and thereby in profits after the entry of the 
ORO.  In other words, the closed-down URO could not sustain their profits that they earned 
before the entry of ORO due to the above reasons. How much change did take place in the 
average daily sales, and average monthly profits after the entry of the ORO? 
 
Average daily sales of URO before and after the arrival of ORO 
Table 4 presents average daily sales, average monthly profit and average monthly wages 
concerning the surviving and closed-down URO before the arrival of ORO. 
 
Table 4: Average Daily Sales, Profit and Wages Before the Arrival of ORO  
and Percentage Difference from Survivors 
Retailer Status 
Average daily sales before the 
arrival of ORO and Percentage 
difference from Survivors 
Average monthly profit before 
the arrival of ORO (RS.) and 
Percentage difference from 
Survivors 
Average  monthly wages before 
the arrival of ORO (RS.) and 
Percentage difference from 
Survivors 
State Survivors Closed Difference Survivors Closed Difference Survivors Closed Difference 
Delhi 8649 6512 33 14088 10386 36 3155 3154 0 
Gurgaon 5089 5904 -14 10325 12125 -15 3070 3500 -12 
Faridabad 9349 7769 20 12930 10647 21 2885 2500 15 
Ghaziabad 7218 5411 33 13668 8625 58 2425 2500 -3 
Noida 7830 3461 126 14630 7800 88 2857 3250 -12 
Chennai 24577 5242 369 15769 12100 30 2531 2029 25 
All 11029 6041 83 14239 10540 35 2909 2725 7 
 
Analysis of the average daily sales data show that the sales of the displaced URO prior to the 
entry of ORO were about 55 percent of the surviving URO. This is mainly due to the fact that 
in Chennai, there is about five times difference in sales of survivors compared to those of the 
displaced. Among the displaced, the daily sales of Rs 7,769 were reported to be the highest in 
Faridabad and the lowest recorded were in Noida that of Rs 3,461.  On the other hand, among 
the survivors, the highest sales of Rs 24,577 were recorded in Chennai and the lowest sales of 
Rs 5,089 were reported in Gurgaon. 
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Table 5: Average Percentage Change in Daily Sales, Profit and Wages Concerning the 
Surviving and Closed Down but Relocated URO after the Arrival of ORO 
Retailer Status Average daily sales  Average monthly profit  Average  monthly wages  
State Survivors Closed  and   Relocated Survivors 
Closed  and  
Relocated Survivors 
Closed and  
Relocated 
Delhi -14 2 -14 26 18 14 
Gurgaon -15 -61 -12 -32 7 3 
Faridabad -19 -29 -14 -14 31 20 
Ghaziabad -14 24 -8 97 30 4 
Noida -15 112 -13 52 7 2 
Chennai -23 45 -23 -5 12 39 
All -18 11 -15 16 21 19 
 
After the entry of the ORO, on average, there has been a drop of 18 percent in the average 
sales of the survivors, whereas there has been an increase of 11 percent in sales of the closed-
down but relocated UOR. Citywise analysis indicates that the survivors as expected have 
witnessed a drop in their sales in all the cities, as they are now competing with the larger 
ORO in their respective locations, whereas the displaced have recorded increased sales in 
Delhi, Ghaziabad, Noida and Chennai after their relocation at the new business sites with the 
exception of Gurgaon and Faridabad. This could be attributed to the fact that the displaced in 
the latter two cities had relocated themselves in adjoining rural areas, to survive the ORO’s 
competition by lowering their operating costs; but in the process recorded lower sales due to 
firstly, agrarian nature of the commodities they sold, which were relatively abundantly 
available in the rural households and secondly, these regions had low monthly per capita 
expenditure (MPCE) as compared to their earlier locations. 
 
Average monthly profits of URO before and after the arrival of ORO 
Analysis of the average monthly profits show that on average the sales of the closed-down 
prior to the entry of ORO were 74 percent of the surviving URO. Among the displaced, the 
monthly profit of Rs 12, 125 was reported to be the highest in Faridabad and the lowest 
recorded was in Noida that of Rs 7, 800. On the other hand, among the survivors, the highest 
profit of Rs 15, 769 was recorded in Chennai and the lowest profit of Rs 10, 325 was reported 
in Gurgaon.  
After the entry of the ORO, on average, there has been a drop of 15 percent in monthly profit 
for the survivors, whereas there has been an increase of 16 percent in the profit of the closed-
down, but relocated URO (Table 5). Citywise analysis indicates that the survivors as 
expected have witnessed a drop in their profit in all the cities, as they are now competing with 
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the larger ORO in their respective locations, whereas the displaced have recorded increased 
profit in Delhi, Ghaziabad, Noida and Chennai after their relocation at new business sites. 
This result is in conformity with the argument of Kohli and Bhagwati (2011) that 
unorganized retailers may gain a larger share in a growing market, while at the same time this 
may not necessarily imply that organized retailers are not faring well.  
 
Average monthly wages of URO before and after the arrival of ORO 
To assess the impact of ORO on wages, we compare the average wages paid by the two 
categories of the URO to their employees. The figures suggest that the payout was about Rs. 
100 per day by these URO before the entry of ORO. After the entry of the ORO, among both 
the categories of survivors and closed-down but relocated URO, the hike in wages had been 
about 20 percent across the sample cities. 
 
Employment Loss 
The assessment of employment loss among the surviving URO indicates that overall 75 
persons had lost their jobs due to the entry of ORO. In Chennai, 136 persons have lost 
employment, whereas in other cities there was increase in employment. There is contrast in 
terms of the survival strategy adopted by the URO in NCR and Chennai to compete with the 
ORO. The stress is on cost reduction in Chennai, whereas in NCR it is on improving their 
service deliveries. In Chennai, the trend noticed was in terms of reduction in manpower, 
which had lead to the reduction in operating cost. But, the NCR region has witnessed increase 
in manpower; there was a reversal of the strategy adopted by the URO employing hired 
manpower. These outlets by hiring 61 additional workers have introduced home delivery 
services and also improved their counter services. In the displaced but relocated category, 
however, there is a clear trend of job loss. Overall, 14 people have lost jobs in the sample 
relocated URO. These outlets when displaced to the margins had to reduce their operating 
cost and hence resorted to reduced manpower in Chennai, Delhi and Noida. Sample relocated 
outlets in Gurgaon, Faridabad and Ghaziabad had earlier hired 1, 1, and 3 persons 
respectively, which remained unchanged in their new locations. 
Thus, overall, the total number of workers hired by the sample surviving URO was 700 
before the opening of ORO, which came down to 625, that is, declined by 10.71 percent.  
With respect to the closed but relocated URO, the total number of persons employed before 
the opening of ORO was 114, which came down to 100 in the new location, that is,  a decline 
of 12.2 percent. 
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Table 6:City-wise status of lost employment 
Retailer Status Number of workers hired by the Surviving UOR  Number of workers hired by the closed but relocated UOR  
State Before  Current Employment lost (numbers) Before  
Current  
Relocated 
Employment lost 
(numbers) 
Delhi 385 440 55 54 45 -9 
Gurgaon 10 12 2 1 1 0 
Faridabad 27 30 3 1 1 0 
Ghaziabad 16 17 1 3 3 0 
Noida 35 35 0 10 8 -2 
Chennai 227 91 -136 45 42 -3 
All 700 625 -75 114 100 -14  
 
In summary, the above evidence based analysis shows that the output supply of UOR has 
reduced and the remuneration to labour (wages) has increased with the arrival of ORO, 
though with slight reduction in labour employment, which are in conformity with the 
theoretical predictions. 
 
Characteristics of the Displaced URO before and after the arrival of ORO: 
Econometric approach 
In order to strengthen the above findings that were based on the evidence based research, 
econometric analysis using the same survey data has been done in the following pages. At the 
outset, drawing on the above information, it is interesting to know how strong the influence 
of the emergence of the ORO on the closing-down of some URO. The survey results show 
that when the closed-down URO were asked how much they agreed to the statement - “you 
closed the previous shop due to the opening of outlets of Big companies.” The answers were 
bounded by fixing the degree of agreements as 100 percent, 75 percent, 50 percent and zero 
percent. Overall, 52 percent of the closed-down URO believed with 75% confidence that 
among the reasons for the closure of their previous shops, the emergence of ORO was the 
main reason and 48 percent responded with 50 % confidence (Table7). 
Nevertheless, summarizing the information arranged in Tables 3 to 6, it can be argued that 
there are different channels through which the negative influence of the entry of the ORO 
was transmitted to the operation of the URO. This can be examined by estimating a bivariate 
probit model with and without the distinctions of cities. The results are presented in Table 8 
and all the coefficients were statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level except in the 
case of age, which is significant at the 8 percent level. The magnitude of the Pseudo R2 
confirms that the selected model is reasonably appropriate to answer the research question 
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with the given data set. The statistically significant coefficients imply that the probability of 
closure was higher for URO having rented premises, larger number of employees and low 
level of daily sales. All these factors reduced the profitability more when new competition 
came in the form of ORO. In combination of these three main reasons, the probability of 
relocating the businesses increases with better education and longer experience. Further 
across cities, the chances of the closure in Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Delhi, and Gurgaon, 
are higher than in Chennai in the same order. Thus, it appears that besides the emergence of 
ORO, there were several other factors influencing the closure of URO. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of the Displaced URO by agreement on the closing-down of the 
previous business location due to the opening of the ORO 
Sl. No. City Number of displaced URO with 50% and 75%  
agreement that ORO are the reason 
Percentage distribution 
    50% 75% 50% 75%   
        (%) (%)   
1 Delhi 88 57 61 39 100 
2 Gurgaon 6 2 75 25 100 
3 Faridabad 16 1 94 6 100 
4 Ghaziabad 1 7 13 88 100 
5 Noida 5 15 25 75 100 
6 Chennai 4 46 8 92 100 
  All 120 128 48 52 100 
 
 
Table 8: Probit Regression for explaining the closure of URO 
URO_state ( 1= closed) Model: Probit 1  Model: Probit 2 
 Coef. Std. Err t P>|t|  Coef. Std. Err t P>|t| 
Monthly _rent 0.0002 0.0000 5.7200 0.0000  9.23E-05 4.16E-05 2.22 0.026 
Age 0.0185 0.0105 1.7700 0.0770  0.0228 0.0108 2.1200 0.0340 
edu_yrs 0.1483 0.0248 5.9700 0.0000  0.1679 0.0261 6.4300 0.0000 
busi_exp_yrs 0.0339 0.0152 2.2300 0.0260  0.0327 0.0152 2.1500 0.0320 
Rented (dummy) 1.5624 0.1514 10.3200 0.0000  1.9774 0.1716 11.5200 0.0000 
num_emp_before 0.8519 0.1548 5.5000 0.0000  1.0367 0.1650 6.2800 0.0000 
avg_dly_sales_before -0.0002 0.0000 -13.4500 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 -10.3000 0.0000 
Constant -3.2342 0.3912 -8.2700 0.0000  -4.9100 0.5245 -9.3600 0.0000 
Delhi      1.2215 0.2263 5.4000 0.0000 
Gurgaon      1.1351 0.3578 3.1700 0.0020 
Faridabad      1.7685 0.3305 5.3500 0.0000 
Ghaziabad      1.4793 0.4093 3.6100 0.0000 
Noida      1.4845 0.3371 4.4000 0.0000 
Chennai      (omitted)    
Log Likelihood -296.443     277.746    
LR chi2(7) 594.92     632.31    
Prob > chi2 (7) = 0     Prob > chi2(12) 0   
Log likelihood         
Pseudo R2 = 0.5009     0.5323    
Correctly Classified 89.88     90.86    
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Note: All the coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level except in the case of the variable ‘age’, which is 
significant at the 8 percent level in Probit Model 1. 
As the declining profitability was one of the important concerns of the closed-down URO, the 
interesting question is: whether the profitability of the closed-down URO improved in the 
new location. Based on the information collected in the survey, the variables influencing 
profitability were used as independent variables to explain the difference between profits 
before and after the relocation of URO due to the emergence of ORO. The heteroscedasticity 
corrected regression results are presented in Table 9 and all the coefficients are significant 
except the variable that shows ORO as the main reason (75% and above) for the closure. The 
results of Table 9 can be summarized (with the concerned variables in square brackets) as 
follows: 
1. Profit was restored or increased for the displaced URO having owners with higher 
education levels. [OWN_EDU (Owners’ education)].  
2. Shops in rented premise are likely to reduce profits [RENTED (Whether new premise is 
rented (=1) or owned (=0)]. 
3. Higher rent means better location and this increases profitability [MON_RENT_NWSHP 
(monthly rent of rented shop)]. 
4. A larger shop carries more items and better choice for the consumers and therefore helps in 
increasing profits [SHP_ARA_OCC_NWSHP (Area occupied by the shop)]. 
5. URO, who answered with 75% confidence that ORO was the main reason for the closure 
of their businesses in the old location, did achieve significant difference in their profits 
before and after the relocation [SHP_CLS_RES_75 (Those reporting ORO as the main 
reason (75 per cent and above) for displacement)]. 
 
Table 9: Explaining the percentage change in profit at the new location with respect to 
profit in the old location before the arrival of ORO 
 White heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS 
Number of observations 186    
Dependent Variable  DIFF_PROFIT    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 23.580 9.376 2.515 0.013 
OWN_EDU 4.478 1.191 3.759 0.000 
RENTED -33.386 6.978 -4.784 0.000 
MON_RENT_NWSHP 0.005 0.002 3.188 0.002 
SHP_ARA_OCC_NWSHP 0.146 0.053 2.768 0.006 
AVG_MON_PRFT_BEF -0.006 0.001 -7.413 0.000 
SHP_CLS_RES_75 7.693 4.352 1.768 0.079 
R-squared 0.435165    
F-statistic 22.98441    
Prob(F-statistic) 0    
Note:  1. No adjustment was done for inflation. 
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2. All the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level except the coefficient 
   of SHP_CLS_RES_75, which is significant at the 8 percent level. 
Combining the results of Tables 8 and 9, it may be argued that the emergence of ORO 
influenced the closure of some URO by reducing their profits. The results also show that the 
increase in profit enjoyed by the displaced URO in the new location seems to be location-
specific in terms of shop space, varieties of products, and rent. It has been a blessing in 
disguise for those who had to shift to other localities due to the decline in sales and profits 
after the arrival of ORO.  They were forced to explore new areas for opening their shops and 
have ultimately benefitted.  It means the closed-down shop keepers have made their presence, 
where there was a demand for such shops and filled the gap, which can be inferred from the 
survey results. It is worth noting that these new locations are not entirely new, as they were 
there when the displaced URO were operating in their old locations. Further, during the 
survey period, there was no new infrastructure development in those areas, which would 
attract new businesses. 
The survey revealed that not all the closed-down URO reopened the same business in 
different locations. The options chosen by the closed-down URO as an alternative source of 
their income may be classified into the following four categories: (a) continued the same 
business; (b) took up just agency; (c) joined the workforce (mainly blue-collar jobs); and (d) 
other low paid jobs such as rickshaw pulling.  Table 10 shows the distribution of the closed-
down URO in these above four categories of sources of income. 
 
Table 10: Distribution of Movers by current activity status (numbers) 
    City 
 
Opened another shop in 
other locality (same 
business) 
Taken up an 
agency 
Joined 
workforce 
Other 
low paid 
jobs  
All  
1 Delhi 99 2 29 15 145 
2 Gurgaon 4   3 1 8 
3 Faridabad 14   2 1 17 
4 Ghaziabad 5   2 1 8 
5 Noida 15   3 2 20 
6 Chennai 50       50 
  All 187 2 39 20 248 
              
% distribution  
1 Delhi 68 1 20 10 100 
2 Gurgaon 50   38 13 100 
3 Faridabad 82   12 6 100 
4 Ghaziabad 63   25 13 100 
5 Noida 75   15 10 100 
6 Chennai 100       100 
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    City 
 
Opened another shop in 
other locality (same 
business) 
Taken up an 
agency 
Joined 
workforce 
Other 
low paid 
jobs  
All  
  All 75 1 16 8 100 
 
Overall, 75 percent of the URO opened another shop with the same business in other 
localities, mostly in newer areas of the city or upcoming urbanized localities.  In NCR region 
the percentage of displaced URO opening up new shop varied between 50% and 99% and 
100% in Chennai.  It is also found that in NCR 38 percent URO owners in Gurgoan, 25 
percent in Ghaziabad , 20 percent in Delhi, 15 percent in Noida and 12 percent in Faridabad 
joined  the workforce. In other words, they were totally displaced from retail business. 
 
Table 11: Multivariate Probit for Explaining the Choice of Livelihood  
after the Closure of the existing business 
Multivariate probit    
Number of Observations 248    
Wald (chi2(15) 66.01    
Prob > chi2 (7) = 0    
Log Likelihood -127.831   Prob 
     
Current_status Coef. Std. Err t P>|t| 
1: Base Outcome (Same business)     
2: Agency     
edu_yrs (years of education) 0.329 0.266 1.240 0.216 
busi_exp_yrs (years of experiencen) 0.043 0.077 0.560 0.577 
flr_ara_ro (Floor area of Shop) -0.007 0.016 -0.460 0.649 
avg_dly_sales_before (Average daily sales) 0.000 0.000 -0.050 0.958 
num_emp_before (number of employees before) 0.460 1.080 0.430 0.670 
_cons -7.260 3.756 -1.930 0.053 
3: Joining the Workforce         
edu_yrs 0.230 0.072 3.210 0.001 
busi_exp_yrs -0.022 0.032 -0.670 0.506 
flr_ara_ro -0.015 0.006 -2.620 0.009 
avg_dly_ sales_before 0.000 0.000 -1.540 0.125 
num_emp_bef -1.561 0.445 -3.510 0.000 
_cons -1.627 0.684 -2.380 0.017 
4: Other         
edu_yrs -0.162 0.094 -1.730 0.084 
busi_exp_yrs -0.128 0.051 -2.520 0.012 
flr_ara_ro 0.001 0.007 0.130 0.897 
avg_dly_ sales_before 0.000 0.000 -1.460 0.144 
num_emp_bef -0.876 0.708 -1.240 0.215 
_cons 1.517 0.814 1.860 0.062 
     
 
Kaliappa Kalirajan & Kanhaiya Singh 
22  ASARC WP 2013/04 
In order to identify the reasons for taking up these different sources of income by the closed-
down URO, a multivariate probit model was estimated using the survey data. The results are 
presented in Table 11 and diagnosis results indicate that the selected model is reasonably 
suitable to examine the research question. The results can be summarized as follows: (i) 
Joining the workforce to earn more or less regular income was preferred over continuing the 
same business in a different location by some, if they had higher education and were having 
smaller business with fewer employees and smaller area of floor earlier; and (ii) Other 
profession such as rickshaw pulling or other types of manual labour was taken up by those 
having lesser business experience and poor education level. 
 
Conclusions and policy Recommendations 
The central question examined in this study is: whether corporate organized retail outlets have 
exerted any harmful effects on the small unorganized retail outlets in India. Answers to the 
question will be useful to gauge the impact of corporate FDI in retail on the survival of the 
small unorganized retail outlets, which is the current debate in momentum in India. Primary 
data were collected from the managers of big shopping Malls, corporate retailers, consumers, 
and those unorganized retailers who were in the vicinity of the corporate retailers between 
November 2008 and March 2010 in NCR and Chennai. The foregoing survey results clearly 
indicate that the possibility of an adverse effect on the unorganized retailing due to the 
emergence of Malls and organized retail outlets in the form of reduced sales of URO can not 
be ruled out. The data indicates that closure is of the order of 30 percent. A sample of about 
24 percent of such closed shops indicated that 75 percent of the closed shops reopened in 
areas away from the operation of the ORO and earned more profits. They earned more profit, 
which is on an average about 16 percent higher than they used to earn before the emergence 
of Malls and ORO in their old location. The increase in profit is as much as 104 percent over 
the profit being earned at the time of the closure. Therefore, closing-down and reopening in a 
suitable location away from the influence of ORO turned out to be beneficial to the concerned 
URO. Further, the emergence of Malls and ORO generated a significant number of 
employments in urban areas. Thus, the emergence of ORO and the moving of URO away 
from the operation of the ORO have produced net social benefit in terms of income and 
employment generation in the concerned region. This indeed is a blessing in disguise for the 
small unorganized retail outlets. 
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However, a McKinsey study (Retail India) argues that retail productivity in India is very low 
compared to international standards. When compared with the retail labour productivity in the 
United States, the labor productivity in Indian retail was only 6% of the United States 
productivity in 2010. When compared with Brazil, which is one of the BRICS countries, 
India's labour productivity in food retailing is only about one third of that of Brazil. The 
report further argues that a complete expansion of the Indian retail sector to levels and 
productivity similar to other emerging economies and developed economies would create 
over 50 million jobs in India. In order to achieve that result, both the Central and State 
governments along with the private sector needs to take steps to provide training and 
development of labour and management for higher retail productivity. Further, drawing on 
the ‘production network’ theme of international trade, through a proper economic policy 
framework, that creates and strengthens the link between ORO and URO, the survival of 
small and unorganized retailers may not be affected adversely. For example, certain activities 
such as packaging and delivery of goods to consumers in far away locations from the location 
of ORO can be subcontracted to URO. One of the conditions imposed by the Indian 
Government on the 51% FDI share in retail that the multinationals will have to compulsorily 
source one-third of the products they sell from small and medium enterprises whose 
investments do not exceed $1 million in total is in line with the above argument. However, 
the contract between ORO and small and medium businesses should be completed before the 
ORO enters the retail market in India; if not, such conditions may not be effectively 
implemented. 
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